Edmund HUSSERL (1859-1938)

• *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (1911)

The problem: philosophy has not yet started
- streng $\gg<exakt$ (not yet complete)
- philosophy as critique of reason
- phil as antipsychologism and pro-humanism
Hegel

• Reactions to Hegel:
  A) Weltanschauungphilosophie
  B) Naturalism
  C) historicism

> of these, naturalism is the only that promises a rigorous philosophy
Naturalism

• nature as a time-space lawfullness (physics) > naturalisation of consciousness (Bewußtsein) and ideals (Ideen & Normen)
• We have found the mechanics of mind in experimental psychology
• Problem: naturalism refutes itself!
Problem of justification: is it rational to naturalise reason?

• Why n?
• Why naturalism would be more justified than something else?
• Consistent naturalism is a *denial* of reason
• H: presupposition of facts leads *either* to relativism *or* to nihilism (*Crisis*, 1936)
Husserl’s objection

• But: pure logic, norms, practical discipline, axiology, theory of knowledge, etc

• "alle Naturwissenschaft ist ihren Ausgangspunkten nach naiv." (p.18)
”Naiv”

• nature just "is" there, as things
• consc. or exp. is there as a thing connected to another thing, the brain
• All psychology presupposes physics
• ”How can experiences be mutually legitimated or corrected by means of each other?”
Vicious circle

- Natural science tries to justify itself
- This makes it impossible to investigate:
  1) how consc or exp can meet/create objects (including themselves!)
  2) how exp can correct itself
  3) how (subjective) experience is supposed to reach something objectively valid
  4) why consc is not irrelevant to things
  5) how naturalism is intelligible
Furthermore,

- Time
- Space
- Causality (and the rest of the Kantian list) are presupposed, not explained, like

- "des Dasein des Forschenden Menschen, seiner psychischen Vermögen" (p.21)
Naiveté: when a naturalistic theory of knowledge studies the relation between consc. and being (Sein), being can appear only as a correlate of consciousness (as perceived, represented, phantasied,) so the rel. can never be explained!

H: phänomenologie des Bewußtseins, as an analysis of the essence of the totality of (pure, not empirical) consciousness
Phänomeologie

• the study of the ground of all objectivities
• the analysis of the structure of consciousness: 
  ”reality” is an object of study only as ”experienced”
• ”What it means that objectivity is … must precisely become 
  evident purely from consciousness itself, and thereby it must 
  become completely understandable.” (p.90)
Naturalistic psychology is based on a confusion

- Empirical consciousness - pure consciousness
  - cf. social statistics - social science
- presupposes something that can not be experimentally observed: consciousness, and its structures
- "What are the things in themselves and to what experience must psychology return to? The answers the subjects give when questioned? And is the interpretation of these answers the experience of the psychical?" (p. 97, 27, 305/6)
Naturalistic naiveté: circularity and the denial of circularity

• access to psychological experience: naive remembrances or empathy (*Einfühlung*)

• The description of these experiences happens under the influence of the scientific assumptions, even if those scientific assumptions are neither given nor originate from experience (i/o) itself

> scientific assumptions can be grounded only on phenomenological analysis
Methodological questions

• "But does a psychology that leaves the concepts that determine its objects without scientific fixation, have a claim to exactness?"

• "Where is the methodological work accomplished in "exact" psychology?" (p. 99)

• "The question of how natural "confused" experience can become scientific experience, as to how one can arrive at the determination of objectively valid empirical judgements, is the cardinal methodological question of every empirical science." (99-100)
Circularity, again

• ”How could psychology fail to see that in its purely psychological concepts it necessarily gives a content that is not simply taken from what is actually given in experience but applied to it?” (101)

• ”How could it miss the fact that the experimental method can not justify its own presuppositions, and that its procedure is radically distinct from that of physics precisely in so far as physics excludes in principle the phenomenological order…” (101)
Moreover...

• "It has neglected to consider to what extent the psychical, rather than being a presentation of a nature, has an essence to itself to be investigated prior to psychophysics."

> following the model of natural science leads to a reification of consciousness

• the concept of ”nature” is itself a non-empirical concept (the space-time lawfullness is not given in (i/o) empirical experience)
Naturalism eliminates experience \textit{as} experience

- Nature is characterised by identity, experience by uniqueness
- natural science eliminates "secondary qualities" from experience, leaving only "primary qualities"; eliminating the "subjective" "appearance" leaving the "objective" "reality"
- questions: 1) on what is the objectivity based? 2) what else is experience than experience?
”Phenomena”

- not a substance
- not units
- not parts
- no causality

- to ask after the causal relations between
  "phenomena" is as absurd as to ask after the causal
  relations between numbers
the field of phen

• numbers, propositions etc. have systematic and rationally intelligible relationships > mathematics, logic, axiology, etc.,

• phenomena have systematic rationally intelligible relationships > phenomenology

> only after the study of phenomena [identity etc.] is science possible
Husserl’s phenomenology

- psychological phenomena do not have a nature, but they do have an essence (Wesen)
- intuitive consciousness, ideation, Wesensschau, that reveals essences (exs. colours, colour >< sound, chair, consciousness, time)
- a priori
H: ”Hume’s mistake”

• phenomenological *wesenschau* is not introspection, inner experience, as Hume claims
• the observation of ”inner” and ”outer” experience is equally naive: they presuppose a phenomenological analysis, not proceed it, far less produce it
post-x: Husserl’s ”mistake”

• ”it is crucial to notice that intuition about essences is in no way ’experience’” (Erfahrung) (112)
• What then? Based on what?

• H: Wesenschau is the ground for identity and sameness
Husserl’s answer: Identity, sameness

• ”That a perception is perception of this object oriented, colored, etc is a matter of the perception’s essence” (obs! intentional inexistence)

• ”That a perception is inserted in a continuity of perception wherein constantly ’the same object presents itself in different orientations’ is purely a matter of essence.”
Antipsychologism

• phenomenology grounds both epistemology and psychology, therefore epistemology is independent of psychology
• phenomenology is the ”science of reason”
• (transcendental argument against historicism and Weltanschauungphilosophie: both presuppose the possibility of critique and therefore reason)
So, natural science can not proceed before phil. grounding, because

• ns presupposes meta-scientific concepts
  – object, subject, causation, time, etc.
• ns presupposes reason
  – the justification of naturalism and critique
• ns presupposes experience that without a philosophical analysis is ”blind”
the task of phenomenology (contra nat.)

- strenge, transcendental, a priori, phenomenological study
- Theory-free, pure description of that "which shows itself"
- There is a method for this: Wesenanschau + eidetic variation, equals roughly: phenomenological reduction - all claims of properties, existence, etc. in parentheses, brackets
Intuitionism

• a special cognitive relation – originary intuition
• Three forms:

1. transcendental
2. eidetic
3. immanent
Transcendent intuition

-sense perception, reveals spatiotemporal causally interconnected individuals (Kant!)

-source of the natural attitude

> might be false
  
two types:

i) external: ”Things”
  
extension, adumbration (Abschattungen), avskuggningar
  
the thing is always beyond the perception of the the thing
  
(transcendent)

ii) internal: ”empirical consc.”: not extended but natural, because belonging to a human body (Leib)
Eidetic intuition

• a priori necessary and synthetic laws
• *Wesen*
• eidetic reduction, eidetic variation
- examples; chair, consciousness, self-consciousness, etc.
Immanent intuition

• non-natural immanent objects; pure lived experience (phenomena)
• adequacy: can not be false
• transcendental reduction
• absolute and primary: fundamental
• Phen is the combination of eidetic and immanent intuition: the study of the essences of pure lived experience: ”a descriptive theory of the essence of the pure lived experiences [reine Erlebnisse]” (Ideen I, §75)
• non-mathematical, because the essences are non-exact
• description (exs: time consciousness, lived body, alterity, intersubjectivity)
• from transcendental reduction to intersubjective reduction (Krisis)
• Phen. red. of a mental phenomenon as mental
  – -> intentionality: intentio/intentum
  – not things!
  – intentio is consciousness as directed
  – intentum is not an an existing thing (not even existing in consciousness)
  – different intentios/noetic acts may have the same intentum (noema) (ex. apple tree), presenting it in different Abschattungen, avskuggningar, adumbrations
intentionality

• distinction between:
  A) real content (noesis)
    - part of the act, immanent
  B) ideal content (noema)
    - not a part of the act, gives intentionality
    (neither of these is actual, Wirklich)
    – (compare type-token)
Phenomenological analysis:

a) real (reellen) contents of the mind
-> noetic analysis
b) their abstract counterparts, ideal contents
-> noematic analysis
c) the relationship between these two
-> correlation analysis
But problem:

• some sensations do not have an intentional object
• So we get:
  a) hyle (sensational, chaotic stuff)
  b) noesis (giving form to hyle)
  c) noema (the abstract ideal content corresponding to noesis)
an intentional act

gives structure to hyle

NOESIS

- HYLE

- REEL BEWUSSTSEIN

- IDEAL

- NOEMA

- WIRK- LICHKEIT

- ACTUAL

gives meaning to noetic act
Horizon

• different noetic acts fill up the corresponding noema only partially
  – different noetic acts are constrained by the noema
  – a noesis foreshadows future noeses (front of the house - back of the house)
  – the noesis goes over and above the hyletic material ("That is a tree")
  – as if a noesis is a node in a network of noeses (compare: concept - other concepts)
Horizon, Lebenswelt

> the horizon of the act
- the given has its co-given
- both anticipates and limits possible future determinations

• Lebenswelt: the totality of interrelated essences
types of noema

• how directly is the noema/intentum given?
  i) signitive (signitive)
  ii) fantasy (Phantasie)
  iii) remembered or anticipated (setzende)
  iv) with-intended (Mit-)
  v) directly present (Gegenwärtigung, Präsentation, Intuition)
phen. and ideality

• - experience (intentio) of ideal/categorical things (ultimately eidos), is included in, e.g., all predication (language!)

• -> phenomenology has to be a theory of this ideal/categorical side of intentional experience
Ex. of the area for phen. research

a) see "a tree": intentum real/actual tree

b) judgement "This tree is in blossom": intentum ideal noema "This tree is in blossom"

c) phenomenological reduction of what it is to be a tree: intentum "the eidos/essence of a tree"

a) and b) are acts of possible truths, c) of necessary truths (a priori, ideal)

• Obs! not a Platonic world of ideas: Wesenanschau is crucial, not the existence os Wesen (which is in the brackets anyhow)
-> it is possible to find the essential characteristics/laws of all ontological areas

• Formal and material ontology
  – Formal: what is it to be an object (Gegenstand)?
  – (formal logic: meaningful expressions, formal o.: objects of these expressions)
  – ex. the law of identity
  – not laws of psych. thought, but of objecthood (against naturalism)- not rules for a game of signs, but necessary laws for meaningful language (against logical positivism)
material/regional ontology

- what different types or regions of objects are there?
- necessary laws for types of objects (a priori)
- extra-scientific criteria for science

• Ex.: -physical, mental, etc.
Phenomenology is transcendental

- because it talks about what makes knowledge possible in general
- the intentio-intentum relationship gives transcendental possibilities of objecthood/knowledge
- the differences between types of acts make out the structure of possible experience
• Ex.: Act A) Intentio: seeing "a tree": intentum "a tree" (noema)
• Act B) Judgement/intentio: "There is a tree in the garden": intentum: ""There is a tree in the garden" (noema)
• -> we can make/experience B without A, but the direct presentation of B presupposes A, so A is constitutive of B
• The task of transcendental phenomenology:
  - formal ontology, object(intentum)-act(intentio) correspondences, constitution hierarchies between types of acts
  -> a complete pure description of the necessary laws of experience
Vienna lecture, 1935
[Die Philosophie in der Krisis der europäischen Menschheit]

“spiritual telos of European man”; this telos is “the free fashioning of its being and its historical life out of rational ideas and infinite tasks.” (1965: 270)
The spiritual *telos* of Europe can not be limited geographically, as Husserl himself emphasises, Eskimos and Gypsies are not included, while the Europeans and their offspring in America are. In the infinity and rationality of the European spirituality, Husserl writes, “[...] lies something unique, which all other human groups, too, feel with regard to us, something that apart from all considerations of expediency, becomes a motivation for them – despite their determination to retain their spiritual autonomy – constantly to Europeanize themselves, whereas we, if we understand ourselves properly, will never, for example, Indianize ourselves.” (1965: 273-274)
for Husserl, it is meaningful to discuss becoming a transcendental subject, or assuming such subjectivity; this is the “constant motivation to Europeanize oneself”. Husserlian transcendental subjectivity is the rational point from which the infinite European tasks can be launched. It is not only structural, so that it can be revealed by a phenomenological reduction, but also the fixed point forming a community, namely Europe.